As a result of a previous debate, I’ve chosen to delve into what I believe to have been one of nastiest and least well-known event in US foreign policy history within the last century.

The case of Guatemala -

I will try to give a simplified yet in depth outline of the events leading up to the 1953 US led coup that overthrew the Arbenz government leading to decades of internal conflict and bloodshed. In the process, I will try to avoid drawing too many conclusions but leave that to the reader.

Why does Guatemala matter, you ask? The early 1950’s saw many changes in how the State Dept and CIA (among other intelligence agencies) approached ‘hostile’ regimes and governments. Even though the US was certainly involved in various types of espionage and covert operations prior to this, the lessons learned during the overthrow of the Mossadegh government in Iran and the Arbenz government in Guatemala led to a more ‘muscular’ form of covert operation. Much of this was fueled by fears of an escalating Cold War and the threat of global Communism. But regardless of motivations or rationale, many of these events have led to ‘blow back’ that still affects the US and the world to this day.

Past is prelude:

From the time of its independence from Spain in 1821 until 1944, Guatemala was rules by authoritarian regimes, none of them democratically elected. Late in 1944, a group of military officials, students and liberal professionals known as the ‘October Revolutionaries’ overthrew the military dictatorship of General Jorge Ubico. Following more bloodshed and political unrest two young military officers, Jacoba Arbenz and Francisco Javier Arana came to power in a final coup which completely unseated the dictatorship. Then, in an unprecedented and extremely popular move, the two men willingly relinquished power to allow for new, democratic elections.

Thus began a period known as ‘The Ten Years of Spring’. It was a decade of greater freedom in terms of speech and political activity as well as proposed land reforms and other progressive government policies aimed at reducing the crushing poverty suffered by most Guatemalans. From 1945 to 1951, Juan Jose Arevalo held the ‘precidencia’. Among his government’s many social and economic reforms were allowances for new political parties and labor unions, greater focus on education and public works and dialogue with political opponents. This was after all the age of the Marshall Plan and the Good Neighbor Policy when government policy in the west was designed, at least on its face, to lead to greater social freedom and economic progress.

By late 1950, both Arana and Arbenz were strong contenders to become the country’s next president. Arana tried to speed up this process in a failed coup which led to his death and ensured the success of Arbenz. Once in office, after a landslide electoral victory, Arbenz continued the policies of Arevalo leading to greater social and economic progress. He also forced many military officials who had supported the old dictator to resign. Among them was a young Colonel, Carlos Castillo Armas, whose dismissal would come back to haunt the Arbenz government.

Arbenz was a liberal and by American standards, would’ve been called a Democrat. One of his greatest political influences was Franklin D. Roosevelt. Arbenz even styled his policies as a ‘New Deal’ for Guatemala; taking much of his inspiration straight from the policies of FDR. In spite of his popularity with the majority of Guatemalans, he was strongly opposed by the upper class as well as military and economic elites. He also gained the ire of the US government by his embrace of Communists at a time when the Cold War was ‘heating up’.

One of his most controversial acts was the legalization of the Communist ‘Guatemalan Party of Labor’ in 1952: This act was used to support the argument that the Arbenz government was pro-Communist. According the then extant constitution, in Clause 32, it was illegal for any political party to have a ‘foreign affiliation’, which the Guatemalan Labor party was known to have had.

Note: anyone familiar with or interested in the extent of the influence of Soviet Communism at the time, see [4] pgs. 107-118

A second problematic act was the purchase of arms from Czechoslovakia which the government said were necessary to improve the quality of materials available to the country’s military, but which the US used as proof of connections to the Soviet bloc.

Another controversial act, begun under the Arevalo government, which proved to be much more consequential was the introduction of land reform policies which directly affected the nation’s largest land owner, the US owned United Fruit Company. At the time, United Fruit owned roughly 40% of Guatemala’s arable land, had monopoly control of all telegraphs and telephone lines and controlled the countries only rail line and only sizable port, Puerto Barrios.

The Arbenz government offered to pay UFC a fair market value for all land they took. Unfortunately, because UFC had been lying about the value of its land in order to pay lower taxes, the offer was refused as being too low (it was 600,000US, quite a heft sum for the time).

What made the trials of UFC so fundamentally important was the fact that with the exception of president Eisenhower himself, virtually every member of the administration had family or business ties to the company and were therefore forced to put pressure on the Guatemalan government in order to protect their personal financial interests at the possible expense of US foreign policy interests.

As a result of these ties, and the influence exerted by those within the administration, the CIA was brought into the situation in order to assess the possible ramifications of overthrowing the Arbenz government. Almost immediately, CIA operatives and ‘assets’ began investigating the situation and quickly arrived at the conclusion that the current government was possibly being infiltrated by ‘Communist elements’ and would certainly make things difficult for US financial interests in the country; despite the fact that there was as much evidence supporting these claims as refuting them.

Because of the combined fears of Communist infiltration and financial upheaval, the CIA began funding and training of a group of anti-Arbenz rebels led by Colonel Castillo Armas. Within a matter of months, from late 1953 to early 1954, with the help of massive propaganda efforts, infusions of cash and American pilots performing strategic bombing runs, all provided by the CIA, Castilla Armas was able to gain the upper hand. He quickly moved his forces from a hidden base in Honduras and began moving toward the capital.

In spite of the fact that Castillo Armas’s force numbered only 500 men, they were able to advance almost all the way to the capital with relative ease. Mostly, this was due to the fact that the government feared that if they destroyed the force, they would be invaded by Marines stationed on US Navy ships conducting a blockade of all Guatemalan ports. After the surrender of a significant army garrison to Castillo Armas’s forces, the army was in open revolt against the government for not taking action. Upon learning of this, Arbenz summoned his cabinet and declared that he would resign his office rather than face possible invasion by the US or open rebellion by the entire military.

In the 11 days following the resignation five successive juntas controlled the country, each more willing than its predecessor to ‘work with the US’. And in the 40 years following the coup Guatemala was engaged in almost constant civil war which led to the deaths of countless numbers of citizens. It was not until the early 1990’s that a peace settlement was finally signed.

The role of the CIA cannot be overstated in this coup. The agency was directly responsible for funding Castillo Armas’s forces, training US pilots in aerial bombardment, massive propaganda campaigns and pressuring US officials to take the hardest possible line regarding the Arbenz government.
Of equal importance were the conflicts of interest present with so many administration officials having close links to one US business affected by the actions of a democratic government.

As a direct result of the ease with which it ‘won’ its campaign in Guatemala, the CIA was certain of its ability to recreate its results throughout the world, especially in Latin America. This overconfidence would be destroyed only seven years later in the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba. The success of the coup against Arbenz and the failures in Cuba may well have done more to strengthen Communism in Latin America than to destroy it and certainly did significant damage to US credibility abroad. Something that still affects us to this day.

Sources:

[1] “Bitter Fruit – The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala” – Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer. Harvard University, 1999. ISBN - 0674075900

[2] “The CIA in Guatemala – The Foreign Policy of Intervention” – Robert H. Immerman. University of Texas Press, 1982. ISBN - 0292780451

[3] “Inevitable Revolutions – The United States in Central America” – Walter Lafeber. Norton & Co., 1994. ISBN - 0393309649

[4] “Comrades! : A History of World Communism” – Robert Service.
Harvard University Press, 2007. ISBN – 067402530x

[5] Guatemala - LANIC - LANIC is a database of information on all Latin American nations. This page focuses on Guatemala exclusively.

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